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IN MEMORIAM: DA VID P. LEONARD
Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.22
Diligent Dave-A Remembrance
I would rather feel compassion than know the meaning of
it. -Thomas Aquinas
Anyone who heard the laudatory adjectives pouring from the
lips of speakers at funeral services for Professor David Leonard
might not think of adding "under-appreciated" to the list. And yet-
despite his devotion to it, no one mentioned Dave's prodigious
scholarship. Oversight? Perhaps. But maybe speakers felt no need to
speak of his writing because it simply reflected the virtues of the
man.
A glance at Professor Leonard's latest writing should suffice to
show the virtues that suffuse it. If one word could capture most of the
qualities mentioned by Dave's eulogists, diligence might do. One
respected dictionary defines diligent this way: "1. of persons-
consistent in application, persevering in endeavor . . . industrious"2 3
Let us take a peek at Dave's work to see these qualities at play.
In 1986, the publishers of Wigmore's massive treatise on the
law of evidence agreed with Professor Richard Friedman's proposal
to produce a completely new work rather than a revision of the
treatise. Professor Friedman spent some time assembling a cadre of
evidence scholars for the task. Dave agreed to do the volume on the
"quasi-privileges"--or as he called them, "Selected Rules of Limited
Admissibility." 24 Diligent Dave completed his assigned volume well
before any of the others.2 5
22. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.
23. THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 666 (2d ed. 1987). The entry also
includes attentive, assiduous, and careful, adding that it comes from the Latin diligere, which
adds "esteem highly" and "take delight in doing."
24. Quasi-privileges resemble true privileges in excluding otherwise relevant evidence for
policy reasons, but differ in giving the holder only a right to bar use at trial, not to refuse to
disclose in discovery; for example, the rule codified in FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
covering evidence of subsequent repairs.
25. General Editor's Introduction to DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY xxxv (1996) (Leonard "has also-
putting others of us to shame -completed this volume, covering a widely disparate subject
matter, with remarkable speed, making it the first volume of The New Wigmore to be
published.").
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Professor Friedman praised Dave for more than his diligence-
for example, he added his "clarity of expression" to the list of
virtues.2 We can see his way with words in his law review articles.
Consider, for example, the practice of some appellate courts when
affirming a decision admitting evidence of other crimes to simply list
all the exceptions in the applicable statute or rule in hopes that the
reader will think one of them might apply. Some writers called this
the "smorgasbord approach,"2 7 but Dave's label-"the kitchen
sink"-seems much more apropos.28
Professor Friedman also lauded Dave for his "sound judgment"29
and "scrupulous fairness."" We can find a good example of this in
Dave's introduction to a symposium published in this law review."
He gives generous descriptions of ideas that he probably found
questionable. And when one of the authors claimed novelty for an
idea that Dave undoubtedly knew goes back at least as far as
Wigmore, Dave passed over this gaffe in silence.32
Finally, Professor Friedman thought the treatise exemplified
Dave's "thoroughness and insight."33 We can also see this in his
effort to explain the verdicts in the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson
cases; he takes an unusual step for an academic by looking at
evidence from the perspective of the jury.34 Similarly, in his analysis
of the use of other crimes evidence to prove knowledge, Dave
26. DAVID P. LEONARD, SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY: THE NEW
WIGMORE xxxv (1996). For an example, see the description of policy at id at lv.
27. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5240, at 479 (1978).
28. David P. Leonard, The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence To Prove Knowledge, 81
NEB. L. REv. 115, 148 (2002).
29. For an example of this, see DAVID P. LEONARD, SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED
ADMISSIBILITY: THE NEW WIGMORE 1.2 (1996) (analysis must always begin with relevance).
30. Id at xxxv.
31. David P. Leonard, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: Introduction, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 515 (2004).
32. In keeping with the spirit of Dave's generosity, I forbear from any identifying details.
33. DAVID P. LEONARD, SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY: THE NEW
WIGMORE xxxv (1996).
34. David P. Leonard, Diferent Worlds, Different Realities, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863
(2001).
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displays a broad vision, including a historical perspective, and makes
a number of careful and crucial distinctions."
Unhappily, the treatise did not allow Professor Friedman to see
another side of Dave's diligence-what the dictionary calls "delight
in doing" and his eulogists called "his sense of humor." But if we
return to the symposium introduction and glance at the footnotes,
Dave modestly reveals that he was not the first person to imagine
Wigmore turning over in his grave and after citing several other
writers who beat him to it, including one who applied the metaphor
to Greenleaf, Dave concludes that "[i]n a sense . . . Wigmore is
rolling over right alongside Greenleaf."" This brings to mind the
four Marx brothers rolling off the boat in barrels during the opening
sequence of their movie "Monkey Business."
Dave's modesty, noted by several of his eulogists, coexisted
with an unusual kind of courage. In his article about the Simpson
trial, he admitted that he erred in predicting the outcome of the case
and, though he would have been justified in using the third person
plural inasmuch as most pundits made the same error, Dave wrote
"I"-a rare use of the first person singular in his work." He then
proceeded, hiding his erudition in the footnotes, to challenge the
conventional explanations for the verdict and to use the King and the
Simpson trials in an imaginative way to illuminate and vindicate jury
verdicts with which he disagreed.
Unlike many of us, Dave had no difficulty in admitting his
mistakes. In an article about the effect of the Supreme Court's Old
Chief decision on the admissibility of other crimes evidence, he
started off with "I began working on this article with a grand idea."38
But he said a bit later "my thesis began to break down as I dug into
the cases and considered more carefully the relevance and probative
value of uncharged misconduct evidence."" If there were a legal
35. David P. Leonard, The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81
NEB. L. REV. 115 (2002).
36. David P. Leonard, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: Introduction, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 515, 521 n.19 (2004).
37. David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different Realities, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863
(2001) ("I was, of course, utterly wrong.").
38. David P. Leonard, The Legacy of Old Chief and the Definition of Relevant Evidence:
Implications for Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 819 (2008).
39. Id. at 820.
737
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 43:711
version of the scientists' long imagined "Journal of Failed
Research,"40 Dave would have had no reluctance in publishing there.
The eulogists mentioned another one of Dave's virtues not
usually associated with legal scholarship-strong moral values. But
while Dave did not wear them on his sleeve, his writing bears clear
marks of a deep moral conviction. For example, in his introduction to
the privileges symposium, Dave noted the impact of socioeconomic
inequality on the distribution of privileges.4' And in his article on the
King and the Simpson verdicts, Dave compared the demographics of
the neighborhoods surrounding the UCLA School of Law and
Loyola Law School on his way to a sobering conclusion: without
greater socioeconomic equality, courts cannot do justice.42
Dave's eulogists traced his moral values to his religion, raising
the question: "what is a nice Jewish boy like you doing in a Jesuit
law school?" "Thriving," apparently. Dave seemed in tune with the
Catholic bishops who wrote of "the responsibility of individuals and
governments to assist the most vulnerable among us."43 Indeed, the
somber conclusion of his King and Simpson article echoes the
Catholic social teaching that law alone does not suffice to end social
conflict.44
We may doubt that Dave ever read Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises
or the pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops on economic inequality.
But apparently he found in his own religious tradition an older
version of that duty spelled out in Gaudium et Spes "to work with all
men in constructing a more humane world."4 5 Perhaps in these times
of divisive ecclesiastical fanaticism, the ability to work across
religious differences to find common ground is David Leonard's
40. The source of this does not readily come to hand, but the idea was that a lot of wasted
effort might be avoided if scientists had some journal where they could discover that someone
else had already found that their "brilliant idea" did not work.
41. David P. Leonard, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: Introduction, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 515, 517 n.6 (2004).
42. David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different Realities, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863,
873-74 (2001).
43. Lucia Ann Silecchia, Catholic Social Teaching and Its Impact on American Law: Some
Observations on the Past and Reflections on the Future, I J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 277, 278
(2004).
44. Id. at 285.
45. Id. at 280.
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most significant legacy to the rest of us-and one that he
characteristically refused to preach except by example.
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried 6
My (Initial) Impressions ofDavid Leonard
I can still remember the very first time I met David several
decades ago. We both had attended an evidence conference in Iowa.
We had not had an opportunity to speak during the conference, but
we had seen each other there. Consequently, when we ended up at
the airport at the same time, we immediately recognized each other
and began to chat.
Since we both had long delays before our flights, we had a good,
long talk. It turned out that we had numerous common interests. We
both were intrigued by many of the provisions in Article IV of the
Federal Rules, and in particular we shared an interest in the validity
of the psychological assumptions underlying those provisions.
During that conversation, I formed two strong impressions of David.
One was that David was a very thoughtful student of evidence law. It
was obvious that he read widely and had thought about many of the
issues far more deeply than I had. Although at that time David was
just beginning his academic career, David had already carefully
dissected many of the provisions in Article IV and had identified the
issues that warranted additional scholarly critique.
My second impression was that, simply stated, David was a
wonderful, friendly, decent human being. We were virtual strangers
to each other, but within a few minutes I felt as if we had known
each other for years. One of the things that struck me was the way in
which David stated his criticisms. If he thought that a doctrine was
unsound or that a specific case was wrongly decided, he couched his
criticism in a temperate, modulated way. David was not inclined
46. Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law.
739
